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ABSTRACT.  In the present paper we address the relationship
between business ownership and economic development. We
will focus upon three issues. First, how is the equilibrium rate
of business ownership related to the stage of economic
development? Second, what is the speed of convergence
towards the equilibrium rate when the rate of business
ownership is out-of-equilibrium? Third, to what extent does
deviating from the equilibrium rate of business ownership
hamper economic growth? Hypotheses concerning all three
issues are formulated in the framework of a new two-equation
model. We find confirmation for the hypothesized economic
growth penalty on deviations from the equilibrium rate of
business ownership using a data panel of 23 OECD countries.
An important policy implication of our exercises is that low
barriers to entry and exit of businesses are necessary condi-
tions for the equilibrium seeking mechanisms that are vital for
a sound economic development.
1.  Introduction
Joseph Schumpeter’s contribution to our under-
standing of the mechanisms of technological
progress and economic development is widely
recognized. In The Theory of Economic
Development he emphasizes the role of the entre-
preneur as prime cause of economic development.
He describes how the innovating entrepreneur
challenges incumbent firms by introducing new
inventions that make current technologies and
products obsolete. This process of creative
destruction is the main characteristic of what has
been called the Schumpeter Mark I regime. In
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Schumpeter
focuses on innovative activities by large and
established firms. He describes how large firms
outperform their smaller counterparts in the inno-
vation and appropriation process through a strong
positive feedback loop from innovation to
increased R&D activities. This process of creative
accumulation is the main characteristic of what
has been called the Schumpeter Mark II regime.
The extent to which either of the two
Schumpeterian technological regimes prevails in
a certain period and industry varies. It may depend
upon the nature of knowledge required to
innovate, the opportunities of appropriability, the
degree of scale (dis)economies, the institutional
environment, the importance of absorptive
capacity, demand variety, etc. Industries in a
Schumpeter Mark II regime are likely to develop
a more concentrated market structure in contrast
to industries in a Schumpeter Mark I regime where
small firms will proliferate.
Most of the 20th century can be described as
a period of accumulation. From the Second
Industrial Revolution till the 1970s the large firm
share was on the rise in most industries and the
economy as a whole. It was the period of “scale
and scope” (Chandler, 1990). It was the era of the
hierarchical industrial firm growing progressively
larger through exploiting economies of scale and
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scope in areas like production, distribution,
marketing and R&D. The conglomerate merger
wave of the late 1960s seemed to have set the
case. The period has the characteristics of the
Schumpeter Mark II regime. However, from the
1970s onwards times have changed. There is
ample evidence that the share of small businesses
in manufacturing in Western economies has started
to rise (Acs and Audretsch, 1993; Thurik, 1999).
Large firms have been downsizing and restruc-
turing in order to concentrate on “core business”
again. In the meantime the entrepreneur has risen
from the dead. High-technology innovative small
firms have come at the forefront of technological
development in many (new) industries. Piore and
Sabel (1984) claim that an “Industrial Divide” has
taken place. Jensen (1993, p. 835) considers it the
period of the “Third Industrial Revolution”. The
last quarter of the 20th century may therefore be
characterized as a period of creative destruction in
the sense of the Schumpeter Mark I regime.
Audretsch and Thurik (2001) refer to a change
from “a managed to an entrepreneurial economy”.
In the present paper we discuss why this change
happened and what its consequences have been for
economic progress and the rate of business own-
ership. We develop a model relating the regime
switch to economic development and present
empirical evidence. In Section 2 we discuss a
variety of theoretical considerations on the relation
between business ownership rates and economic
development. It is followed by Section 3 where we
present our two-equation model. The first equation
explains the change in the business ownership rate
while the second equation explains economic
growth. The notion of an equilibrium business
ownership rate, being a function of the level of
economic development, is crucial in the analysis.
In Section 4 we present the data of 23 OECD
countries and in Section 5 we present the estima-
tion results. The final section is used for discus-
sion.
2.  Theory
In this section we will discuss how business own-
ership rates and economic development are inter-
related. We will pay attention to the role that the
“Schumpeterian regime switch” has played in this
relationship. We discuss the pre-1970s era of
declining self-employment rates and the period
thereafter in which the rates have risen in most
Western economies. Next we discuss how the
business ownership rate at the economy-wide level
can be used to determine the extent of structural
transformation.
The first three quarters of the 20th century can
be characterized as a period of declining small
firm presence in most industries. In many Western
countries and industries this decline has ended and
even reversed. Many old and large firms have
been losing ground to their small, new and more
entrepreneurial counterparts. It suggests a switch
from a (more) Schumpeter Mark II type of regime
towards a (more) Schumpeter Mark I type of
regime. Audretsch and Thurik (2001) label this as
a regime switch from “a managed to an entrepre-
neurial economy”. We note that the regime labels
are rough approximations as the industrial land-
scape shows a far too great variety to claim that
in each and every industry one of the Schumpeter
regimes is prevailing. A further complication is
that business ownership and entrepreneurship are
not synonymous for at least two reasons (see also
Amit et al., 1993).
First, entrepreneurial energy is not limited to
self-employed individuals. Large companies
promote “intrapreneurship” within business units
to achieve more flexibility and innovativeness
(Stopford and Baden-Fuller, 1994). Second,
business owners serve many roles and functions.
Many researchers distinguish between
Schumpeterian (or real) entrepreneurs and man-
agerial business owners (Wennekers and Thurik,
1999). Entrepreneurs are a small fraction of the
business owners. They own and direct independent
firms that are innovative and “creatively destroy”
existing market structures. After realizing their
goals Schumpeterian entrepreneurs often develop
into managerial business owners, but some may
start new ventures. Managerial business owners
dominate in the large majority of small firms.
They include many franchisees, shopkeepers and
people in professional occupations. They belong
to what Kirchhoff (1996) calls “the economic
core”. Occasionally, entrepreneurial ventures grow
out of them. In an empirical context it is difficult
to discriminate between managerial business
owners and entrepreneurs. Profiles of individual
business owners would be required. Moreover, the
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discrimination is a theoretical one since most
business owners are neither pure
“Schumpeterians” nor pure “shopkeepers” but
share the attitudes associated with these extremes
in a varying degree (Audretsch and Thurik, 1998).
Despite these conceptual problems we argue
that the secular trend of the business ownership
rate declining and afterwards starting to rise again
presents a fair indication of the general develop-
ment of the level of entrepreneurship, at least in
modern economies. It shows how the (secular)
decline of “mom-and-pop” businesses in tradi-
tional sectors like retailing and craft has tended
to become compensated for by a rise in new
ventures in services and high-tech industries in the
period from the 1970s onwards.
The impact of economic development on
business ownership
The proportion of the labor force that is self-
employed has decreased in most Western countries
until the mid-1970s. Since then the self-employ-
ment rate has started to rise again in several of
these economies. Blau (1987) observes that the
proportions of both male and female self-
employed in the nonagricultural U.S. labor force
declined during most of this century. He also
observes that this decline bottomed out in the early
1970s and started to rise until at least 1982. The
data used in the present paper show that the
business ownership rate in the U.S. has continued
to rise in the 1980s while stabilizing in the 1990s.1
More recently business ownership increased in
several other countries as well. We will first
discuss the period of decline of business owner-
ship (Mark II regime) followed by a discussion
of the period of reversal of this trend (Mark I
regime).
Decline of business ownership
Several authors (Kuznets, 1971; Schultz, 1990;
Yamada, 1996) have reported a negative relation-
ship between economic development and the
business ownership (self-employment) rate. Their
studies use a large cross-section of countries with
a wide variety in the stage of economic develop-
ment. 
There are a series of reasons for the decline of
self-employment, and of small business presence
in general. Lucas (1978) shows how rising real
wages may raise the opportunity cost of self-
employment relative to the return. Given an under-
lying “managerial” talent distribution this induces
marginal entrepreneurs (in this context Lucas
refers to managers) to become employees. This
pushes up the average size of firms. Schaffner
(1993) takes a different approach. She points out
that “over the course of economic development the
advantages firm owners derive from being less risk
averse (better diversified) than self-employed
producers are likely to rise relative to the disad-
vantages caused by the costliness of circumventing
asymmetric information problems” (p. 435).
Iyigun and Owen (1998) develop a model
implying that economic development is associated
with a decline in the number of entrepreneurs
relative to the total number of employees. They
argue that fewer individuals are willing to run the
risk associated with becoming an entrepreneur as
the “safe” professional earnings rise with
economic development. 
Chandler (1990) stresses the importance of
investment in production, distribution, and man-
agement needed to exploit economies of scale and
scope during the period after the second indus-
trial revolution of the second half of the 19th
century. It was a period of relatively well-defined
technological trajectories, of stable demand and of
seemingly clear advantages of diversification.2
Reversal of the trend
Several authors have provided evidence of a
reversal of the trend towards less self-employ-
ment. Acs et al. (1994) report that of 23 OECD-
countries, 15 experienced an increase in the
self-employment rate during the 1970s and 1980s.
They show that the weighted average of the self-
employment rate in OECD-countries rose slightly
from 8.4% in 1978 to 8.9% in 1987. Closely
related to the development of the self-employment
rate is the development of small business presence
in general. Some of the other sources showing that
the growing importance of large business has
come to a halt in Western countries include
Carlsson (1989), Loveman and Sengenberger
(1991), Acs and Audretsch (1993), Acs (1996) and
Thurik (1999).3
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There are several reasons for the revival of
small business and self-employment in Western
economies.4 First, the last 25 years of the 20th
century may be seen as a period of creative
destruction. Piore and Sabel (1984) use the term
“Industrial Divide”, Jensen (1993) prefers the term
“Third Industrial Revolution”, while Freeman and
Perez (1988) talk about the transition from the
fourth to the fifth Kondratiev wave. Audretsch and
Thurik (2000) stress the effects of globalization
and the information revolution leading to the
demise of the comparative advantage of Europe in
many of the traditional industries, such as machine
tools, metalworking, textiles and automobile
production. The most obvious evidence is the
emergence of new industries like the software and
biotechnology industries. Small firms play an
important role in these new industries. Acs and
Audretsch (1987) provide empirical evidence that
small firms have a relative innovative advantage
over their larger counterparts in such highly
innovative industries. Evidence for the compara-
tive advantage of small firms in inventing radi-
cally new products is also given in Prusa and
Schmitz (1991) and Rothwell (1983, 1984).
Second, new technologies have reduced the
importance of scale economies in many sectors.
Small technology-based firms started to challenge
large companies that still had every confidence in
mass production techniques (Carlsson, 1989).
Meredith (1987) argues that small firms are just
as well, or better, equipped to implement techno-
logical advances and predicts the factory of the
future to be a small factory. Jensen argues that “It
is far less valuable for people to be in the same
geographical location to work together effectively,
and this is encouraging smaller, more efficient,
entrepreneurial organizing units that cooperate
through technology” (Jensen, 1993, p. 842). This
is supported by Jovanovic claiming that: “recent
advances in information technology have made
market-based coordination cheaper relative to
internal coordination and have partially caused the
recent decline in firm size and diversification”
(Jovanovic, 1993, p. 221). Others, like Rothwell
(1983, 1984), stress that large and small firms
complement and succeed each other in the inno-
vation and diffusion process. See also Nooteboom
(1994) for an account of this concept of “dynamic
complementarity”.
Third, deregulation and privatization move-
ments have swept the world. In countries like
Australia, Finland, Italy and Sweden there have
been strong tendencies to deregulate and priva-
tise (OECD, 1995, pp. 39–49). Phillips (1985)
reports that small firms have dominated in both
the creation of new businesses and new jobs in
deregulated industry sectors in the U.S. in the
early 1980s. This confirms some preliminary
empirical evidence as provided by Shepherd
(1982). Governments have also begun to acknowl-
edge and promote the vital role of small (start-up)
firms in achieving economic growth and develop-
ment. See Storey and Tether (1998), OECD (1998)
and EIM/ENSR (1994, 1996).
Fourth, there has been a tendency of large firms
to concentrate on “core competences” (Carlsson,
1989). Jovanovic (1993) reports that the 1980s
were characterized by corporate spin-offs and
divestment. Aiginger and Tichy (1991) blame
much of the “back-to-basics” and downsizing (or
rightsizing) tendencies on the opportunistic con-
glomerate merger wave of the late 1960s.
Fifth, the increasing incomes and wealth have
enabled individuals to strive for “higher” needs.
As a result the demand for variety increases
(Jackson, 1984). Cross-cultural influences have
also enlarged the demand for variety. Small firms
are often the most obvious suppliers of new and
specialized products. The decrease in diversifica-
tion as reported by Jovanovic (1993) suggests that
large firms have not been capable of entering into
such market niches.
Sixth, self-employment is more highly valued
as an occupational choice than before. Roughly
one out of four young U.S. workers pursue self-
employment according to Schiller and Crewson
(1997). Kirchhoff (1996) argues that self-employ-
ment is not characterized anymore as under-
employment or as mom-and-pop establishments,
but as a way to achieve a variety of personal goals.
Also, as hypothesized in the social psychology
there is a Maslowian hierarchy of human motiva-
tions, with physical needs at the bottom and self-
realization at the top (Maslow, 1970). A higher
level of prosperity will induce a higher need for
self-realization and may stimulate entrepreneur-
ship.5
Finally, the employment share of the services
sector has been well documented to increase with
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per capita income (Inman, 1985). Given the rela-
tively small average firm size of most services
(barring airlines, shipping and some business and
financial services) this creates more opportunities
for business ownership.
Obviously, some of these factors may have a
temporary effect only. For example, it is not
unlikely for the outsourcing and deregulation
waves to dry up. On the other hand, there are more
permanent effects like the impact of new tech-
nologies. We refer again to Freeman and Perez
(1988). They claim that in the new techno-
economic paradigm (fifth Kondratiev wave) the
organization of firms will be “networks” of large
and small firms. See also Oughton and Whittam
(1997) who emphasize the role of external
economies of scale when explaining the viability
of small firms. Moreover, the introduction of these
new technologies is also positively related to the
stage of economic development because they
cannot be made effective without the necessary
skills and other investments. This structural
influence of economic development is reinforced
by the increasing variety of demand for special-
ized goods and services and the enhanced valua-
tion of self-realization which are also dependent
on the level of prosperity.
An equilibrium rate of business ownership
In the present paper we investigate whether coun-
tries that deviate from the “equilibrium” business
ownership rate for comparable levels of economic
development suffer in terms of economic growth.6
For this we develop an error-correction model to
determine the “equilibrium” rate of business
ownership as a function of GDP per capita. The
notion of “equilibrium” appears more akin to neo-
classical economic theory than to a Schumpeterian
framework. However, in our empirical application
the “equilibrium” concerns the labor market and
not the product market.
Equilibrium rates of self-employment in the
neo-classical framework can be derived by making
assumptions about (1) the aggregate production
function combining the efforts of business owners
and wage-employed individuals and (2) their
rational occupational choice between self- and
wage-employment. Differences in the assumptions
about which factors influence the choice for self-
employment lead to different equilibrium models.
Two early contributions are Lucas (1978) and
Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979). Lucas assumes
individuals to have different managerial abilities
while Kihlstrom and Laffont assume individuals
to differ with respect to their risk attitudes. Calvo
and Wellisz (1980) extend the Lucas model by
introducing a learning process through which
managers acquire the necessary knowledge. In a
recent paper, Peretto (1999) presents a model in
which “development and growth are subsequent
stages of the process of structural transformation
that economies undergo as they advance from
poverty to affluence” (p. 390). This model as well
as related models (see for example Lloyd-Ellis and
Bernhardt, 2000) suggest that the stage of
economic development is the driving force of
“equilibrium”.
We hypothesize an “equilibrium” relationship
between the rate of business ownership and per
capita income that is U-shaped.7 The U-shaped
pattern has the property that there is a level of
economic development with a “minimum”
business ownership rate.8 Many forces may cause
the actual number of business owners to deviate
from the long-term equilibrium rate. Such a
“disequilibium” may result from cultural forces,
institutional settings (regulation of entry, incentive
structures, functioning of the capital market) and
economic forces (unemployment, profitability of
private enterprise). See Kirzner (1997), Davis and
Henrekson (1999) and Henrekson and Johansson
(1999).
There are several forces in market economies
that contribute to a process of adapting towards
the equilibrium. An example may illustrate this. A
high labor income share and a structurally low
number of enterprises have contributed to struc-
tural unemployment in the late 1970s and 1980s
in many Western economies. Such high levels of
unemployment may have various consequences.
First, unemployment may have a direct effect on
self-employment, as unemployed are claimed to
be more likely to become self-employed than
employees. See for instance Storey (1991) and
Evans and Leighton (1989).9 Second, structural
unemployment gradually results in wage modera-
tion helping to restore profitability of private
enterprise (lower labor income share). In addition,
a perceived shortage of business ownership will
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induce policies fostering entrepreneurship, ranging
from better access to financing to competition
policies. See OECD (1998). The overall impact of
these equilibrating processes are hard to observe
directly and may therefore be modelled best using
an error correction mechanism.
The effect of business ownership on economic
growth
There is some evidence on the relation between
size class distributions and economic performance.
For instance, see Nickell (1996), Nickell et al.
(1997) and Lever and Nieuwenhuijsen (1999) who
present evidence that competition, as measured by
increased number of competitors, has a positive
effect on the rate of total factor productivity
growth.10 Carree and Thurik (1998, 1999) show
that the share of small firms in manufacturing
industries in European countries has a positive
effect on the industry output growth. Thurik
(1996) reports that the excess growth of small
firms11 has had a positive influence on percentage
change in gross national product for a sample of
16 European countries in the period 1988 through
1993.12
A theoretical endogenous growth model was
developed by Schmitz (1989). His model predicts
that an increase of the proportion of entrepreneurs
in the working force leads to an increase in long-
run economic growth. See also Holmes and
Schmitz (1990) who develop a model of entre-
preneurship in the spirit of T. W. Schultz. They
show how specialization in managerial tasks and
entrepreneurship – responding to opportunities for
creating new products and production processes
– may affect economic development. Finally, some
evidence of a well-established historical (long-
term) relationship between fluctuations in entre-
preneurship and the rise and fall of nations has
been assembled by Wennekers and Thurik (1999).
Also the work of Eliasson (1995) on economic
growth through competitive selection is of rele-
vance. He shows (for the Swedish economy) how
a lack of industry dynamics affects economic
progress not so much on the short term but very
strongly so on the long term (from about two
decades on).
Another source of evidence on the relation
between self-employment and progress is the
economic history of the formerly centralized
planned economies. A characteristic of these
economies was the almost complete absence of
small firms (and private ownership of the means
of production), and this extreme monopolization
constituted one of the major factors leading to the
collapse of state socialism (Acs, 1996). The devel-
opment of small enterprises is considered a vital
part of the current transition process in Eastern
Europe.13
In the present paper we investigate whether
deviations between the actual and the equilibrium
rate of business ownership will diminish the
growth potential of an economy in the medium
term. A shortage of business owners is likely to
diminish competition with detrimental effects for
static efficiency and competitiveness of the
national economy. It will also diminish variety,
learning and selection and thereby harm dynamic
efficiency (innovation). On the other hand, a glut
of self-employment will cause the average scale
of operations to remain below optimum. It will
result in large numbers of marginal entrepreneurs,
absorbing capital and human energy that could
have been allocated more productively elsewhere.
Iyigun and Owen (1998) show in a dynamic
model with two types of human capital (profes-
sional and entrepreneurial) that a misallocation of
the existing human capital stock between profes-
sional and entrepreneurial activities may occur.
The nature of the inefficiency, however, is not
clear-cut. There may be too much entrepreneur-
ship or too little, depending on how entrepre-
neurial and professional skills contribute to the
level of technology. They find that “a more effi-
cient ratio of professional and entrepreneurial
skills will raise the steady state of technology, the
wages paid to human capital providers, and there-
fore, the economy’s human capital stock” (p. 457).
Their model supports our notion that deviations
from the level of “equilibrium” entrepreneurial
activity come at a cost of lower economic perfor-
mance. See also Peretto (1999) who derives a
hump-shaped relation between the number of
firms and returns to investment and R&D.
3.  Model
The object of this section is to develop a model
of the interrelationship between business owner-
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ship and economic development at the macro
level. The model consists of two main equations.
The first equation deals with the causes of changes
in the rate of business ownership whereas the
second deals with its consequences. From the first
equation we derive the equilibrium rate of
business ownership as a function of the stage of
economic development. In the second equation we
estimate the effect on economic growth of devi-
ating from this equilibrium rate. 
The first equation of the model relates the
change in the rate of business ownership Eit in
country i in year t to the extent to which this rate
deviated from the equilibrium rate E*it, to the
unemployment rate Uit and to the labor income
share LIQit. The second equation of the model
relates the extent of economic growth to the
(absolute) deviation of the actual business own-
ership rate from the equilibrium rate. Economic
growth is measured as the relative change in the
variable YCAPit, the per capita gross domestic
product in purchasing power parities per U.S.
dollar in 1990 prices in country i and period t. We
correct for catching-up effects by including the
level of economic development. The equations use
the notation 
 
∆4Xt = Xt – Xt – 4. The third equation
presents the equation relating the equilibrium
business ownership rate to the level of economic
development. It is assumed to be a quadratic
function of ln(YCAPit + 1).14 The model reads as
follows:
The symbols stand for the following variables: 
E: number of business owners per labor
force;
E*: equilibrium number of business owners
per labor force;
YCAP: per capita GDP in purchasing power
parities per U.S. $ in 1990 prices;
U: unemployment rate;
U: sample average of unemployment rate;
LIQ: labor income share;
LIQ: sample average of labor income share;
ε1, ε2: disturbance terms in equations (1) and (2),
respectively.
Business ownership 
In Equation (1), the variable to be explained is the
growth in the number of business owners per labor
force in a period of four years. The first explana-
tory variable in the equation, which has the
parameter b1 assigned to it, is an error correction
variable describing the difference between the
equilibrium and the actual rate of business own-
ership at the start of the period. The parameter b1
is expected to have a positive sign. In this version
of our model the equilibrium function is U-shaped
with respect to per capita income (Equation (3)
has a quadratic form). Because the parabola should
first drop and then rise, we expect the parameter
γ to be positive and the parameter β to be negative.
In case of absence of economic development
(YCAPit = 0) the equilibrium function equals α.
Since the relative number of business owners
cannot be negative or in excess of one, the para-
meter α should lie between zero and one.
As a second explanatory variable we use lagged
unemployment acting as a push factor for business
ownership.15 The expected sign of the parameter
b2 is positive. We choose a lag of six years instead
of four for this variable because mental prepara-
tion, practical procedures and legal requirements
are involved in starting a new enterprise. 
As a third explanatory variable we use labor
income share. This variable is a pragmatic proxy
for the earning differentials between expected
profits of business owners and wage earnings. We
assume that a relatively high business profitability
(as compared to wage earnings) acts as a pull
factor for business ownership. The labor income
share is defined as the share of labor income
(including the “calculated” compensation of the
self-employed for their labor contribution) in the
net national income. The expected sign of the
parameter b3 is negative. As with the unemploy-
ment variable, a time lag has been included.
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∆4Eit = b1(E*i, t – 4 – Ei, t – 4) + b2(Ui, t – 6 –U)
+ b3(LIQi, t – 6 – LIQ) + ε1it, (1)
∆4YCAPit
YCAPi, t – 4
= c0 + c1 |E*i, t – 4 – Ei, t – 4|
= + c2YCAPi, t – 4 + ε2it, (2)
E*it = α + βln(YCAPit + 1) 
+ γln2(YCAPit + 1). (3)
Economic growth 
In Equation (2), the variable to be explained is
economic growth in a four-year period, measured
as the relative change in gross domestic product
per capita. The first determinant of growth is the
(absolute) deviation of the actual number of self-
employed (business owners) from the equilibrium
rate of business ownership at the start of the
period. As explained in a previous section, the
deviation variable is expected to have a negative
impact on growth.16
Next to this deviation variable, we use the level
of per capita income at the start of the period as
a control variable. It allows to correct for the con-
vergence hypothesis of countries: countries which
are lagging behind in economic development grow
more easily than other countries because they can
profit from modern technologies developed in
other countries. The expected sign of the para-
meter c2 is negative. 
4.  Data and estimation technique
We use data of 23 OECD countries including
the fifteen countries of the EU-15, Australia,
Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway,
Switzerland and the U.S. and for the period 1976
through 1996.17 Data are made available for the
even years only. The main data sources are the
OECD Labour Force Statistics and the OECD
National Accounts. In Table I some summary
statistics values are given for the first and last year
of the sample and the mid year 1988 (due to lags
only the period 1980–1996 will be used in the
estimation procedure).
From Table I we see that Australia, Greece and
278 Martin Carree et al.
TABLE I
Summary statistics for the 23 OECD countries 
Country E1976 E1988 E1996 YCAP1988 E*1988
Austria 0.077 0.069 0.074 15,651 0.112
Belgium 0.098 0.109 0.119 15,326 0.113
Denmark 0.081 0.056 0.064 16,263 0.110
Finland 0.059 0.076 0.080 15,456 0.112
France 0.105 0.099 0.088 16,421 0.110
Germany (West) 0.070 0.070 0.082 17,245 0.109
Greece 0.179 0.186 0.196 07,274 0.180
Ireland 0.074 0.091 0.100 09,735 0.145
Italy 0.142 0.169 0.183 15,289 0.113
Luxembourg 0.093 0.075 0.062 21,103 0.107
The Netherlands 0.092 0.082 0.102 14,867 0.114
Portugal 0.110 0.116 0.160 08,424 0.161
Spain 0.109 0.122 0.130 10,886 0.135
Sweden 0.068 0.064 0.081 16,632 0.110
United Kingdom 0.074 0.101 0.109 15,590 0.112
Iceland 0.099 0.101 0.130 17,368 0.109
Norway 0.089 0.084 0.071 17,301 0.109
Switzerland 0.069 0.071 0.085 20,133 0.107
United States 0.081 0.107 0.104 21,543 0.107
Japan 0.126 0.123 0.101 16,328 0.110
Canada 0.078 0.106 0.128 18,573 0.107
Australia 0.147 0.164 0.154 16,154 0.111
New Zealand 0.098 0.116 0.133 13,532 0.119
Average 0.096 0.102 0.110 15,526 0.118
Note: The business ownership rates E are per labor force. The business ownership figures are exclusive of the business owners
in the agricultural sector. The unit of GDP per capita (YCAP) is purchasing power parities per U.S. $ at 1990 prices. In the last
column the estimated equilibrium business ownership rates for 1988 are given, using the estimates of α, β and γ from the “Two
yearly” case from Table III. Germany refers to West-Germany for 1976 and 1988. This business ownership data set is referred
to as COMPENDIA 2000.1.
Italy have the highest levels of self-employment
(business ownership) in 1988: more than 15% of
the labor force. The unweighted sample average
level of self-employment in that year is 10%. The
countries with the lowest levels of self-employ-
ment in 1988 are Denmark and Sweden: six
percent of the labor force. Looking at the GDP per
capita in 1988, we see that the United States,
Switzerland and Luxembourg are the most affluent
countries while Greece, Ireland, Portugal and
Spain are the least affluent countries in the sample.
The unemployment rates are not given in the table
but they were highest in the 1980s in Ireland and
Spain. Low unemployment rates were found in
Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Iceland and
Luxembourg in that period.
Variables and sources
The variable definitions and their main sources are
given below.
E: Self-employment or business ownership.
This variable is defined as the number of business
owners (in all sectors excluding the agricultural
sector), expressed as a fraction of the labor force.
Data sources include the OECD Labour Force
Statistics 1976–1996 and 1978–1998. EIM com-
pleted the missing data by using ratios derived
from various other sources. Furthermore, EIM
made a unified data set of business owners as the
definitions of business owners or self-employed
(we use these terms interchangeably) in the OECD
statistics are not fully compatible between
countries. In some countries business owners are
defined as individuals owning a business that
is not legally incorporated. In other countries,
owner/managers of an incorporated business
(OMIBs) who enjoy profits as well as a salary are
considered owners too. There are also countries
who classify a part of the OMIBs as self-employed
and another part as employee. This results from a
different set-up of labor force surveys in different
countries.18 By and large, Australia, Japan,
Norway and U.S. use a narrow business owner-
ship definition (excluding OMIBs or excluding
most OMIBs), while the other countries apply a
broader characterization (including OMIBs or
including most OMIBs). Business owners in the
present report are defined to include OMIBs. For
the countries not following this definition, EIM
made an estimation of the number of OMIBs
using information derived from The European
Observatory for SMEs (KPMG/ENSR, 2000), or
using information from domestic sources for the
non-European countries.19 Another difference in
definition is that for some countries unpaid family
workers are included in the self-employment data
as well, mostly for early years. For these years,
the unpaid family workers were removed from the
data by using ratios from more recent years for
which separate data on unpaid family workers are
available. Finally, for countries where important
unclarified trend breaks occur, these trend breaks
were corrected for. Data on the labor force are also
from the OECD Labour Force Statistics. Again,
some missing data have been filled up from
various other sources.20
YCAP: Gross domestic product per capita. The
underlying variables gross domestic product and
total population are from OECD National
Accounts 1960–1996, Detailed Tables, and from
the OECD Labour Force Statistics 1976–1996 and
1978–1998, respectively. GDP is measured in
constant prices. Furthermore, purchasing power
parities of 1990 are used to make the monetary
units comparable between countries.
U: (standardized) unemployment rate. This
variable measures the number of unemployed as
a fraction of the total labor force. The labor force
consists of employees, self-employed persons,
unpaid family workers, people employed by the
Army and unemployed persons. The main source
for this variable is OECD Main Economic
Indicators. Some missing data on the number of
unemployed have been filled up with help of data
from the OECD Labour Force Statistics and
the Yearbook of Labour Statistics from the
International Labour Office. 
LIQ: labor income share. Total compensation
of employees is multiplied by (total employ-
ment/number of employees) to correct for the
imputed wage income for the self-employed
persons. Next, the number obtained is divided by
total income (compensation of employees plus
other income). The data on the separate variables
are from the OECD National Accounts
1960–1996, Detailed Tables. Some missing data
have been filled up with help of data from the
OECD Labour Force Statistics.
When estimating the model, we weight the
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observations with population. We consider larger
countries such as the U.S. and Japan to be more
important in establishing the relationship between
business ownership and economic growth than
small countries. When the data of, for example,
Luxembourg or Iceland would call for a different
relation, we would not want this to have a big
impact on the estimation results. 
5.  Estimation results
To estimate the model (1)–(3) we substitute
equation (3) into equation (1):
∆4Eit = a0 – b1Ei, t – 4 + b2Ui, t – 6 + b3LIQi, t – 6
+ a4 ln(YCAPi, t – 4 + 1) 
+ a5 ln2(YCAPi, t – 4 + 1) + ε1it (4)
We apply (weighted) least squares to this equation
and then find estimates for the equilibrium relation
parameters through:
These coefficients are substituted into Equation (3)
so that we can calculate E*. This variable is incor-
porated into Equation (2). This equation is then
also estimated using (weighted) least squares. 
We consider two samples. The first is the “Two
yearly” case in which data for all the even years
are used (1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990,
1992, 1994 and 1996). The total number of obser-
vations then equals 207. As an alternative we use
the “Four yearly” case in which data for the years
1980, 1984, 1988, 1992 and 1996 are used. The
total number of observations then equals 115. The
reason for removing observations from the sample
is that the observation periods for two consecutive
even years overlap. This may lead to a downward
bias in the estimated standard errors of the coef-
ficients.
Weighting with population (in the year t-4)
implies that all variables (including constants and
dummies) are multiplied with the square root of
population before the least squares procedure is
run. A more detailed description of the weighting
of observations can be found in the Appendix to
this paper.
The estimation results of model (1)–(5) are
given in Table II.
From Table II we see that most coefficients are
significant with the expected signs: unemployment
has a positive effect on self-employment and the
effect of labor income share is negative (coeffi-
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αˆ =
βˆ =
a0 + b2U + b3LIQ
b1
,
, .
a4
b1
a5
b1
γˆ =
(5)
TABLE II
Estimation results of model (1)–(5)
Parameter Two yearly Four yearly Parameter Two yearly Four yearly
a0 0.049 0.038 α 0.538 0.254
(1.1) (0.6) (0.6) (0.2)
b1 0.050 0.049 β –0.127 0.104
(2.8) (1.8) (0.2) (0.1)
b2 0.066 0.057 γ –0.004 –0.050
(4.5) (2.8) (0.0) (0.3)
b3 –0.030 –0.034 c0 0.222 0.205
(2.2) (1.8) (7.5) (5.6)
a4 –0.006 0.005 c1 –0.488 –0.349
(0.2) (0.1) (3.0) (1.9)
a5 –0.000 –0.002 c2 –0.008 –0.007
(0.0) (0.3) (5.3) (3.8)
R12 0.224 0.197 R22 0.504 0.569
N 207 115 N 207 115
Note: Absolute t-values are between brackets.
cients b2 and b3, respectively). Furthermore, the
hypothesized error-correction process and the
negative impact on growth of deviating from
equilibrium also seem to be supported: coefficients
b1 and c1 are significantly positive and negative,
respectively. The speed of adjustment is low: 5%.
However, the results on the error-correction
process and the growth penalty should be inter-
preted with caution, since the estimated equilib-
rium relation between the business ownership rate
and per capita income appears not well deter-
mined: coefficients α, β and γ have very low t-
values. 
Special position of Italy
The low t-values for the equilibrium relation
coefficients may be caused by the existence of
certain (large) countries with specific develop-
ments in the business ownership rate not covered
by our model. This could influence the estimates
towards implausible results. The country we
suspect may deviate most from the other countries
is Italy. Looking at Table I, we see that Italy
combines a high level of self-employment with a
near average level of per capita income. This is
not in accordance with what we would expect: the
countries with a high rate of self-employment
(business ownership) are generally in a less
advanced stage of economic development (for
example Greece). Italy can be divided in two
different economies: a well-developed economy
(Northern Italy) and a less developed economy
(Southern Italy or the Mezzogiorno). Italy might
not fit well in our model because it basically
consists of two different economies. A closer
inspection of the data for Northern and Southern
Italy21 shows that Northern Italy in particular
deviates from the expected pattern, i.e., the
U-shaped trend of the relative number of business
owners set out against per capita income. Here, a
high self-employment rate is combined with a
relatively high value of GDP per capita. Small and
medium-sized firms seem to play a bigger role in
(Northern) Italian manufacturing than in other
industrialized countries.22 A notable feature of the
organization of Italian small and medium-sized
firm production is its high geographical concen-
tration in small areas or industrial districts (Piore
and Sabel, 1984). The geographical distribution
also shows that the majority of small and medium-
sized manufacturing firms is located in Northern
and Central Italy (Acs and Audretsch, 1993). They
often have a strong family component. 
The Italian model of extensive small and
medium-sized firm production differs from that
in other countries in similar stages of develop-
ment. It may have positive and/or negative effects
on economic growth. Many of the Italian firms are
highly specialized and are organized on a flexible
basis, so as to meet specific customer needs, and
produce well designed and fashionable goods,
aimed at the richest segments of the market.
Another characteristic of the Italian model is that
Italian R&D expenditures as a percentage of GNP
are by far the lowest among the largest OECD-
countries. They amount to only half of that in
Germany, the U.S. and Japan over a long period
(Klomp and Pronk, 1998, p. 167). Hence, the
number of business owners in Northern Italy is
higher than one would expect on the basis of the
advanced stage of economic development. The
data for Southern Italy seem to be in conformity
with the general pattern: there is also a high level
of self-employment but combined with a low value
of the GDP per capita. 
Looking again at the Italian data in Table I, we
see that Italy not only has a relatively high self-
employment rate but also that self-employment in
Italy continues to rise. Therefore we suspect that
the hypothesized error-correction process does not
apply to the Italian economy. We approach this
problem by introducing a dummy variable DITA
that is 1 for the Italian observations and 0 else-
where. That is, we have the error term in Equation
(1) equal to ε1it = a0, ITADITA + ηit. 
The estimation results of the model including
the “Italy-dummy” are given in Table III. 
We see that the t-values of the estimated coef-
ficients of the hypothesized U-shape of the equi-
librium rate of business ownership in Table III are
higher than those presented in Table II. Also, the
coefficients are in accordance with our expecta-
tions. The estimates of β and γ have the predicted
signs and that of α lies between zero and one.
However, the t-values of β and γ are still not high.
This is not surprising, considering the high
correlation between the linear and the quadratic
ln(YCAPit + 1) variables. Indeed, the Wald test for
the hypothesis that β and γ are jointly zero is
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rejected. Furthermore, an analysis of –β/2γ (which
is the minimum of the parabola in terms of
ln(YCAPit + 1)) shows that this expression does
have a high t-value, implying that the log-
quadratic specification performs reasonably well.
Further investigation of the parabola shows that
for the “Two yearly” case the minimum value is
reached for a level of per capita income of 20,398
U.S. dollar (in purchasing power parities) at
1990 prices. The minimum level of equilibrium
business ownership is 10.7% of the labor force.
In Figure 1 we show the equilibrium curve and the
actual data for the G7-countries. In this figure also
the (YCAP; E) combinations for the “out-of-
sample” years 1972, 1974 and 1998 are incorpo-
rated. For the “Four yearly” case the value of the
minimum is 0.103 and it is attained at a level of
23,930 U.S. dollar. We will concentrate on the
results of the “Two yearly” case as they are similar
to the “Four yearly” one.
The last column of Table I presents the equi-
librium business ownership rates in the year 1988.
Greece has the highest equilibrium rate, 0.180.
Most of the countries are close to the minimum
of the curve, though. The two richest countries,
Luxembourg and the United States, have an
equilibrium rate which is close to the minimum
of the curve. These countries have reached a level
of per capita income in 1988 which just exceeds
the GDP per capita level at which the equilibrium
rate reaches its minimum. For the interpretation of
this parabola describing the equilibrium rate of
business ownership given a certain stage of
economic development, it should be noted that the
relation is based upon a limited range of values
of GDP per capita. For values of per capita income
far outside our sample range – for example less
developed countries or GDP per capita levels
twice as high as attained in the richest countries
in our sample – the equilibrium rate of business
ownership may not be described properly by the
quadratic function. Furthermore, U-shaped equi-
librium functions cannot be distinguished from
L-shaped functions in a statistical sense, because
the majority of the GDP per capita values in our
sample lie below the level associated with the
minimum of the parabola.
As before, we find that the hypothesized error-
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TABLE III
Estimation results of model (1)–(5), including dummy for Italy in (4)
Parameter Two yearly Four yearly Parameter Two yearly Four yearly
a0 0.109 0.098 α 0.863 0.743
(2.5) (1.5) (2.5) (1.5)
b1 0.120 0.120 β –0.494 –0.398
(5.4) (3.6) (2.0) (1.1)
b2 0.063 0.055 γ 0.081 0.062
(4.5) (2.8) (1.7) (0.9)
b3 –0.011 –0.014 c0 0.182 0.183
(0.8) (0.7) (8.9) (7.6)
a4 –0.059 –0.048 c1 –0.571 –0.576
(1.9) (1.0) (2.7) (2.4)
a5 0.010 0.007 c2 –0.006 –0.006
(1.6) (0.9) (5.3) (4.5)
a0, ITA 0.011 0.011
(4.9) (3.4)
P-value of Wald test on β = γ = 0 0.002 0.042
Minimum value of E* at –β/2γ 3.06 3.22
(12.5) (5.2)
R12 0.307 0.274 R22 0.500 0.575
N 207 115 N 207 115
Note: Absolute t-values are between brackets.
correction process of the number of business
owners towards the equilibrium rate is supported:
the estimate of b1 is significantly positive. The
speed of adjustment is not high: the deviation from
equilibrium at a certain point in time decreases
with 12 percent in a period of four years. The low
value of the speed of adjustment is not surprising.
The convergence process of the actual business
ownership rate towards the equilibrium rate is
intrinsically slow because it involves structural
changes on the supply side (setting up enterprises,
investments in physical and human capital, divest-
ments, etc.) as well as cultural and institutional
changes. Note that the estimate of b1 is higher than
in Table II, in which the “Italy-dummy” was
excluded from the model. It shows that Italy is an
exception to the general pattern of the business
ownership rate adjusting towards the equilibrium
level. The lack of error-correction for Italian self-
employment is also clear from Figure 1.23
The estimate of b2 points at a positive impact
of unemployment on self-employment: every
percent point rise in the unemployment rate leads
to a rise of 0.06 percent point in the self-employ-
ment rate in the succeeding six years. This is in
accordance with evidence in some earlier studies:
unemployment is a push factor for self-employ-
ment. The other variable explaining the change in
self-employment, the labor income share, has the
expected effect: the estimate of b3 is negative. The
effect is insignificant, though. This means that we
fail to find evidence for our variable of business
profitability to act as a pull factor for business
ownership. The remaining variable in the business
ownership equation, the “Italy-dummy”, shows
a significant positive coefficient. The rate of
business ownership in Italy rises faster ceteris
paribus than in other countries.
Another important characteristic of the estima-
tion results is the deviation of the actual number
of business owners from the equilibrium rate
having a negative impact on economic growth: the
estimate of c1 is significantly negative.24 This
implies that economies with a business ownership
rate below the equilibrium may benefit from
stimulating new start-ups. In case this rate exceeds
the equilibrium, it suggests that there are impor-
tant impediments to growth for small and medium-
sized enterprises. In the growth equation, the per
capita income parameter c2 is estimated to be
negative. This might reflect the convergence of
countries hypothesis. However, it may also be a
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Figure 1.  The actual and equilibrium rate of business ownership for G7-countries, 1972–1998.
within (regression-to-the-mean) effect: a higher
value of GDP per capita in a certain year leads to
a smaller economic growth in the subsequent
period. Finally, the constant term c0 is positive. 
A comparison of the third and sixth column of
Table I shows that in 1988 most countries had too
few self-employed relative to the equilibrium
value. An obvious exception is Italy. It indicates
that the high level of self-employment in Italy is
not efficient: it has a relatively large negative
impact on economic growth.25 Another exception
is Australia. But as opposed to Italy, Australia
moved in the direction of equilibrium between
1988 and 1996, as can be seen from the fourth
column of Table I. Countries which experienced
very low business ownership rates compared to the
equilibrium include the Scandinavian countries.
These economies are chacterized by a large public
sector, relatively low entry and exit rates and high
taxes. Eliasson (1995) and Braunerhjelm and
Carlsson (1999) blame part of Sweden’s relatively
bad economic performance in the 1980s on limited
private initiative and a lack of structural adjust-
ment. Another country with a relatively low
business ownership rate is Germany. In Figure 1
it is shown that, at least until recently, Germany
has failed to restructure where for example the
United Kingdom has. Klodt (1990) blames (West)
German industrial policy for repressing structural
change in supporting large-scale industries with
subsidies. An important reason for the lack of a
vibrant sector of new firms and industries in
Germany up till the mid 1990s has been the high
barriers to innovative activity (Audretsch, 2000).
An example of important economic reforms trans-
forming an economy from a regulated one to a
market-orientated one with increasing business
ownership rates is New Zealand (see e.g. Evans
et al., 1996). Carlsson (1996) shows the strong
increase in the number of firms as a result of the
reforms, certainly when compared to countries like
Sweden. After a painful transition period the New
Zealand’s reforms appear to ultimately have
generated economic growth (McMillan, 1998; and
Silverstone et al., 1996). The data in Table I
suggest that, indeed, business ownership rates
were below equilibrium values for New Zealand
before the start of the reforms in 1984. The
increase in business ownership rates has been
fierce in the period thereafter and may be “over-
shooting”, making some “shake-out” of newly
entered entrepreneurs likely.
6.  Discussion
Business ownership has received considerable
attention from policy makers in European coun-
tries. The high unemployment rate coupled with
limited economic growth in Europe has triggered
a plea by policy makers for rethinking the policy
approach that fostered prosperity during the post-
war era. In two ways globalization has reduced the
ability of the European countries to generate
economic growth and create jobs. On the one hand
the advent of new competition from low-cost
countries in Asia and Central and Eastern Europe
has flooded the EU markets. On the other hand,
the telecommunications and computer revolutions
have drastically reduced the cost of shifting capital
and information out of the high-cost locations of
Europe and into lower-cost locations around the
globe (Audretsch and Thurik, 2000).
It is deeply embedded in the current European
policy approach that the creativity and indepen-
dence of the self-employed contribute to higher
levels of economic activity. In modern economies
a great variety of organizations is involved in
making innovative products. This is the case
particularly in niche markets like in the ICT sector.
The more organizations are active in such markets,
the greater the chance that an innovation takes
place. Variety and selection play a dominant role
in this mechanism. Therefore, major funds of
governmental institutions and independent donor
organizations are being channeled towards young
and small firms. The present paper aims at
achieving some first insights into whether such
policies are justified in different phases of
economic development.
We seek to explain the interrelationship
between economic progress and the size class
structure of firms. The present paper zooms in on
one specific linkage: that between the number of
business owners and economic development.
Three aspects of this linkage are investigated.
First, we investigate whether there is a long-term
equilibrium relation between the number of
business owners and the stage of economic devel-
opment. This conjecture arises from analysing
empirical and theoretical work in this area. The
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relation is hypothesized to initially be a decreasing
function of economic development in that the
self-employment rate is high in low-developed
economies whereas more highly developed coun-
tries where mass production and scale economies
thrive have lower self-employment rates. A large
literature points at a still later phase of economic
development where the business ownership rate
is increasing again. This phase is characterized by
“the reversal of the trend” towards increasing
economies of scale and scope. Therefore we
formulate the equilibrium business ownership to
have a U-shaped relation with respect to economic
development. Second, we investigate whether
there is a correction mechanism when the rate of
business ownership is out of equilibrium and
compute the speed of convergence. Deviations
from equilibrium can occur due to exogenous
shocks and institutional divergences, for instance,
because “government regulation of market activity
is likely to obstruct and frustrate the spontaneous,
corrective forces of entrepreneurial adjustments”
(Kirzner, 1997, p. 81). Third, we investigate
whether deviating from the equilibrium rate of
business ownership leads to lower economic
growth. The three aspects are tested using a two-
equation model. The first equation explains the
growth of the number of business owners using
the deviation between the actual and the equilib-
rium rate of business ownership, unemployment
as a push factor and the labor income share as a
measure of business profitability. The second
equation explains economic growth using the
deviation between the actual and the equilibrium
rate of business ownership, and the per capita
income level. The model is tested using a data
panel of 23 OECD countries. 
We find evidence for a long-term equilibrium
relation between economic development and
business ownership. However, U-shaped equilib-
rium functions cannot be distinguished from
L-shaped functions in a statistical sense. In fact,
the large majority of countries has levels of
economic development smaller than that at which
the U-curve reaches its “minimum”, making the
“equilibrium function” largely L-shaped.
We find evidence for an error correction
mechanism between the actual rate of business
ownership and the equilibrium rate. Lagged
unemployment appears to be a significant push
factor of business ownership. Italy plays an
exceptional role in our sample of 23 OECD
countries in that there appears to be an additional
autonomous increase of the rate of self-employ-
ment which may have frustrated economic growth.
The rate of business ownership is found to
influence economic growth through deviations
from the equilibrium rate. This result supports the
view that size distribution differences across
countries matter when explaining economic per-
formance (Davis and Henrekson, 1999). As a
consequence, economies can have both too few
or too many business owners and both situations
can lead to a growth penalty. By and large, a five
percent point deviation implies a growth loss of
three percent over a period of four years.
An important policy implication of our exer-
cises is not only that “To induce dynamic entre-
preneurial competition we require the fulfillment
of only one condition: guaranteeing free entre-
preneurial entry into any market where profit
opportunities may be perceived to exist” (Kirzner,
1997, p. 74), but also that exit free of stigma and
financial burdens has to be safeguarded. See also
Acs et al. (1999). Low barriers to entry and exit
of business owners are a necessary condition for
the equilibrium seeking mechanisms which are
vital in our model of the relation between business
ownership and economic development.
The results presented in this study should be
interpreted with caution. The very concept of the
economy-wide rate of business ownership entails
several difficulties of interpretation. For example,
it is impossible to make the rates perfectly statis-
tically comparable across countries. In addition,
the composition of the rates are unclear: high-tech
start-ups are indistinguishable from old mom-and-
pop businesses in the retail sector (with the same
number of employees). Nevertheless, we argue
that this paper may provide a good starting point
for a promising line of research. As an important
issue we mention that while the present research
is based upon country-wide composites, sectoral
diversity between countries probably plays a
role when explaining differences in equilibrium
situation and differences in the equilibrium
restoring mechanism. 
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Appendix: Weighted regressions
Estimation results are obtained by weighting the observations
with the number of inhabitants. In this appendix we provide
the rationale. For simplicity we consider the case of cross
sectional data (i.e. no time dimension).
Suppose that there are N regions in L countries with
L << N. In our case, L would be 23 because we have 23
countries in our data set. We assume that these N regions are
all of the same size. Thus, for example, the U.S. would have
many regions the size of Luxembourg. If we would dispose
of data per region, we would propose the following model
for a linear relationship between two variables x and y:
yR, i = βxR, i + εR, i,    i = 1, . . . , N (regions). (a)
The subscript R is used to denote that the data are assumed to
be available at the regional level. The OLS-estimator of β in
(a) is then
However, we have data at the aggregated level of countries
and not at the level of regions. Given our assumption that the
regions are equally large, we write the model with the vari-
ables x and y at the country level (subscript C) as 
yC, j = βxC, j + εC, j,    j = 1, . . . , L (countries), with    (b)
The variable Di, j is defined as follows: Di, j = 1 if region i lies
in country j and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, Nj denotes the
number of regions in country j (∑Lj = 1Nj = N). Hence, we
assume that the variables x and y at the country-level can be
written as the averages of the variables over the regions of
the country. When we translate these country-level variables
yC, j and xC, j in (b) back to the regional level variables yR, i and
xR, i in (a), we obtain the following observations for our
original model (a) at the regional level:
Observations for which:
Di, 1 = 1:     y*R, i = yC, 1 x*R, i = xC, 1 (N1 observations)
.
.
Di, L = 1:     y*R, i = yC, L x*R, i = xC, L (NL observations)
Writing the data at the regional level in this manner, it is
implicitly assumed that within countries, the various regions
are identical. With these observations, the OLS-estimator can
be written as:
Thus, here it is assumed that there are N observations where
for every observation (region) within a country, the variables
have identical values. However, we have only L observations
and then the OLS-estimator of β from (b) reads as
We see that this estimator is different from b*OLS(a), which we
would like to have. The estimator bOLS(b) does not take into
account that different countries have different numbers of
regions, or stated differently, that the various countries are not
equally large. Therefore, we weight the observations by pre-
multiplying the variables xC and yC from (b) with the square
root of the number of regions. The (weighted) least squares
estimator bWLS(b) reads as
We see that the WLS-estimator of (b) is exactly the same as
the OLS-estimator of (a), b*OLS(a). Clearly, we do not know the
number of regions per country. We use the population size as
a proxy. 
Notes
1 There is considerable controversy about the number of U.S.
self-employed. Publications which deal with various issues on
estimating the actual number of business owners in the U.S.
include Fain (1980), Bregger (1996), Dennis (1997) and
Chapter 3 of The State of Small Business; a Report of the
President 1996, Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office. Most controversy is about measuring the number of
incorporated self-employed. In the present paper we basically
follow the approach taken by USSBA (2000), p. 5, in which
the number of incorporated self-employed is estimated by the
number of employer firms.
2 Audretsch and Thurik (2001) characterize this period as one
where stability, continuity and homogeneity were the corner-
stones and label it the managed economy.
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bOLS(a) =
N
∑
i = 1
xR, iyR, i
N
∑
i = 1
xR, ixR, i
.
∑
Di, j = 1yC, j = Nj
yR, i ∑
Di, j = 1
xC, j = Nj
xR, i
and .
b*OLS(a) =
N
∑
i = 1
x*R, iy*R, i
N
∑
i = 1
x*R, ix*R, i
L
∑
j = 1
NjxC, jyC, j
L
∑
j = 1
NjxC, jxC, j
= .
bOLS(b) =
L
∑
j = 1
xC, jyC, j
L
∑
j = 1
xC, jxC, j
.
bWLS(b) =
L
∑
j = 1
√Nj xC, j √Nj yC, j
L
∑
j = 1
√Nj xC, j √Nj xC, j
.
3 See also the various editions of The European Observatory
for SMEs that provide an account of the state of small business
in Europe, for instance EIM/ENSR (1997).
4 Brock and Evans (1986) were the first to provide an
elaborate overview.
5 Entrepreneurial energy as such may not suffice for
economic progress. Baumol (1990) stressed the importance
of entrepreneurship being led into productive channels.
6 Small deviations are unlikely to have much impact. See e.g.
Simon (1991, pp. 41–42): “organization size and degree of
integration, and the boundaries between organizations and
markets, are determined by rather subtle forces. The wide
range of organizational arrangements observable in the world
suggests that the equilibrium between these two alternatives
may often be almost neutral, with the level highly contingent
on a system’s history”.
7 Schultz (1990) reports having found statistical evidence for
a quadratic relationship between the share of wage earners and
the stage of economic development.
8 In case the “minimum” is reached at a level of per capita
income exceeding those attained in the data set, the relation
can be better described as L-shaped.
9 Alba-Ramirez (1994) shows that for both Spain and the
U.S. the duration of unemployment increases the probability
of becoming self-employed. His analysis suggests that the
effect of unemployment duration on the probability of
becoming self-employed is not very different for the two
countries, albeit stronger for the U.S. The results are inter-
esting especially since the Spanish economy has a higher
degree of unemployment and self-employment when compared
to the American economy. The results suggest that the
influence of unemployment on business ownership is a
common feature across economies. Alba-Ramirez also notes
that legislation aimed to help the jobless starting up their own
businesses has been implemented across developed countries
and provides the example of the Spanish 1985 law giving
lump-sum unemployment insurance to workers becoming self-
employed. 
10 Acs et al. (1999) point at differences in competition and
entrepreneurship when comparing the more successful U.S.
economy to that of Europe and Japan.
11 The excess growth of small firms in that study is defined
as the percentage change in the value-of-shipments accounted
for by small firms minus that accounted for by large firms.
12 A subset of small firms which are assumed to improve
economic performance are the so-called New Technology-
Based Firms (NTBFs). Many of the businesses can be found
on Science Parks of which the number in many countries has
increased strongly during the 1980s and 1990s. Storey and
Tether (1998) show that most of the NTBFs are, in fact, small
firms. They report the average number of employees to be
around 20 both in France and the U.K. The two countries were
the first in Europe (in 1969) to establish science parks
(Cambridge Science Park in the U.K. and Sophia Antipolis in
France). They claim that Italy serves as an example of lagging
behind in the establishment of “advanced” science parks and
relate this to the relatively low proportion of university
research that is financed by the Italian private sector.
13 See for example Russia’s Shatalin Plan, which “is built on
the assumption that society needs small enterprises to orient
production to the needs of every person, to fight the dictator-
ship of monopolies in consumer and production markets, and
to create a favourable environment for quick introduction of
new scientific and technological ideas” (Nolan, 1995, p. 82).
14 In Carree et al. (2000) we compare four different specifi-
cations of the relationship between the equilibrium business
ownership rate and GDP per capita, based upon an earlier
version of our business ownership dataset (COMPENDIA
1999; in the present paper we use COMPENDIA 2000.1, see
Section 4). The log-quadratic specification adopted in the
present paper was found to outperform the other specifications
in terms of goodness of fit, although not by much. The
estimates of the error-correction parameter b1 and the growth
penalty parameter c1 did not differ much between the four
specifications.
15 Audretsch and Thurik (1998), in an earlier empirical
investigation for 23 OECD countries find a positive effect of
the (lagged) change of unemployment on the change of the
self-employment rate.
16 In Carree et al. (2000) we consider an alternative penalty
function based on the squared instead of the absolute devia-
tion. For each of the shapes of the equilibrium function the
absolute deviation penalty structure outperformed the squared
deviation case.
17 For the unemployment rate and the labor income share we
also use data of 1974.
18 This topic is dealt with in Chapter 5 of OECD Employment
Outlook June 2000.
19 For the United States, sources include The State of Small
Business; a Report of the President 1996.
20 Contact André van Stel for further information about these
business ownership data (ast@eim.nl). The data set is referred
to as COMPENDIA 2000.1.
21 Separate data for Northern and Southern Italy are obtained
from Eurostat Regions Statistical Yearbook.
22 The size of newly established firms in Italy is very small
in comparison with the size of incumbent firms (see Santarelli
and Sterlacchini, 1994).
23 We have also run a regression of equation (4) with
dummy-variables included for all countries in the sample. We
found the error-correction effect to increase to 0.20 and the
growth penalty to become insignificant (t-value below unity).
Because one possible interpretation of such a regression is that
every country has its own unique equilibrium level, these
results are not surprising. However, this type of country-
specific equilibrium levels is not the focus of this study, since
we are investigating a “universal” equilibrium function which
should be valid for all countries. Indeed, as we described
earlier, we do not even interpret the “Italy-dummy” as
reflecting a country-specific equilibrium. Instead, we interpret
it as an autonomous additional rise in the number of business
owners, not necessarily favouring economic growth.
24 We do not include country-specific dummies in Eq. (2).
However, when including such dummies the coefficient of c1
remains negative and the value of the estimate barely changes,
both in the “Two yearly” case and the “Four yearly” case. This
is also found for both cases when the “Italy-dummy” in the
first equation is excluded (as in Table II). Likelihood ratio test
statistics testing whether or not to include country-specific
dummies in equation (2) have values between 34.0 and 46.5
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for the four cases of Table II and III. These values are close
to the critical values at 5% (33.9) and 1% (40.3).
25 In Italy, research and development expenditures are by far
the lowest among the largest OECD countries as a percentage
of gross national product. This is in line with the idea that
when there are too many business owners, the scale advan-
tages in research and development are not utilized. See Cohen
and Klepper (1996). 
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